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The purpose of the present essay is to defend two related notions. The more specific notion that I 
seek to defend is Richard Kearney’s conception of God as posse, of God as a possible God. His 
position has recently been criticized for three separate reasons: that it is not radical enough, that 
it is crypto-metaphysical, and that it forecloses the most profound aims of ethics. At a broader 
level what seems to be at stake is the opposition between partisans of radical finitude, those who 
hold that the most profound questions are encountered at the limits of thought, and an alternative 
“infinite” conception that Kearney shares with Paul Ricoeur, which maintains that fidelity to un-
predictable events opens the way to what is most profound about the human condition. In re-
sponse, I argue that the criticisms fail to hit their mark because they presuppose a broadly Der-
ridean or post-modern position in order to make their argument, when it is just those presupposi-
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Whether one chooses to lead one’s life by 
means of a belief in a god or not, and how 
one does so in light of such commitments, is 
a central existential and practical matter for 
anyone’s life. This question orients our 
sense of what goals we deem worthy of pur-
suing, what codes of conduct - at least in 
part - we deem necessary to observe, and 
above all it provides a distinct sense of our 
human place in the universe. Perhaps it is 
for these reasons that one finds a broad pub-
lic interest in question of religious belief in 
our modern world. Richard Dawkins and 
Stephen Hawking are but two of the most 
well-known of many recent authors to have 
engaged this topic.1 Yet philosophy as a dis-
cipline has stood at some distance from this 
discussion, despite the clear public interest 
in it. The reason for this is that philosophical 
discussions on God tend to suffer from a fa-
tal defect: they deadlock almost immediately. 
Atheists are likely never to accept any proof 
for God’s existence, and theists are likely 
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never to accept that their proofs are incorrect. 
It would seem, as a result, that despite the 
public interest in the matter, there is little 
scholarly interest in it. As intense, personal, 
and practical as the discussion might be, it 
would appear that philosophy has almost 
nothing new to say about the topic. 
 
It is in light of this deadlock that Conti-
nental philosophy as a whole, and herme-
neutics in particular, has something of spe-
cific value to contribute. This tradition of 
thought has followed a path that Søren Kier-
kegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche opened. 
Rather than pursue the question “does God 
exist?” it has instead pursued “what kind of 
god would be worth believing in, would be 
worth hoping for, should such a being exist?” 
This is the sort of question that theists and 
atheists alike can pursue, so that it does not 
result in an immediate deadlock, and it has 
equally proven to be of both scholarly and 
public value. Charles Taylor’s A Secular 
Age (2007), for example, has renewed this 
scholarly discussion, and Hubert Dreyfus 
and Sean Kelly’s All Things Shining (2011), 
which pursues a defense of polytheism on 
existentialist grounds, has become a national 
best seller. 
  
The key problem, when one takes up this 
approach, is what has come to be known as 
the problem “nihilism.” Nietzsche’s 
(in)famous statement that “God is dead. God 
remains dead. And we have killed him.” 
compresses the two related aspects of this 
matter (1974, p. 181). One aspect concerns 
the annihilation of Christian values, the fact 
that the Christian God does not provide 
meaning for “Western” culture as He did 
around 1500. The other concerns the distinct 
possibility that all our lives are but much 
sound and fury signifying nothing - a total 
annihilation of meaning - which might be 
termed the problem of absurdity. Nietzsche 
and the tradition of Continental philosophy 
following him, further linked both of these 
aspects to a metaphysical view on the world. 
The metaphysics of presence is a view on 
the world that is taken to be exemplified in 
the works of Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thom-
as Aquinas, and which at the same time gave 
rise to the scientific approach to reality that 
denies any place to existential meaning.2 It 
maintains that being is to be defined in terms 
of its presence, in terms of what it is here 
and now, in its actuality, and thus allows one 
to manipulate it maximally according to 
one’s best use of instrumental reason - as 
one finds, for example in cost-benefit analy-
sis. Such a view on reality has no place for 
existential meaning. The implication for the 
philosophy of religion, then, is that even if 
one were to believe in God’s existence, one 
would have to do so within a framework that 
did not draw upon the traditional metaphysi-
cal accounts, on the metaphysics of presence, 
since it is just those accounts that resulted in 
both the secularization of our contemporary 
culture and the broader problem of absurdity 
in modern life. 
  
Two of the most robust accounts of God 
that have been provided in response to the 
problem of nihilism are those by Jacques 
Derrida and Richard Kearney, though they 
have not thus far seen eye-to-eye. My spe-
cific aim of the present essay, then, is to 
provide a defense of two related philosophi-
cal notions. At one level, I seek to defend 
Richard Kearney’s conception of a possible 
God, God understood as “posse,” the God 
who may be, from some recent Derridean 
criticisms, notably John Caputo’s and Mark 
Dooley’s, which suggest that his conception 
belongs to the tradition of the metaphysics 
of presence. At a more general level, be-
cause the criticism Kearney’s work has re-
ceived is of a distinctively Derridean kind, 
what is at stake in this defense concerns the 
viability of an alternative to Derridean 
thought, the viability of a program of 
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thought that is not committed to radical 
finitude in the way that he is. Insofar as Der-
rida’s commitment to radical finitude may 
be understood to be shared by Giorgio 
Agamben, Martin Heidegger, even Slavoj 
Žižek, and insofar as Kearney’s commitment 
to an alternative, one could call it: the pro-
gram of infinite thought, is shared by think-
ers as diverse as Alain Badiou and Paul Ric-
oeur, the stakes of this opposition are signif-
icant for Continental philosophy as a whole, 
and not only the philosophy of religion.3 
  
The argument that I pursue in what fol-
lows, then, makes the case both that there is 
a viable alternative to the program of radical 
finitude, and that Kearney’s conception of 
God as “posse” is part of that alternative. 
One result of this argument is thus to sug-
gest that it is not possible, as Derrideans 
have done, simply to assume that because 
Kearney does not share their basic philo-
sophical commitments that his conclusions 
are misguided. A second result is that it 
might be possible to lead one’s life mean-
ingfully if guided by a conception of God as 
posse, which, following Kearney, entails an 
ethical task for human living, a kind of eth-
ics of translation. 
 
Because exegetical points have in some 
ways resulted in the current disagreement, 
the present investigation will be served well 
by proceeding slowly and with clarity. I 
begin, then, with a thorough review of the 
three charges that Derrideans have leveled 
against Kearney, specifically, and Ricoeur, 
from whom he draws, more generally.   
 
1. The Three Charges 
 
Although Kearney’s work has been dis-
cussed by other groups than Derrideans or 
Continental philosophers generally, to my 
mind it is the Derridean critique that poses 
the most serious challenge.4 John Caputo 
and Mark Dooley, while always friendly and 
appreciative in their responses, have made 
the strongest case in this regard. Taken to-
gether, one finds that they have leveled three 
separate charges: that Kearney’s work is Not 
Radical Enough, that it is Crypto-
Metaphysical, and that it Forecloses Ethics, 
or at least the most profound point of ethical 
responsibility. I take up these charges each 
in turn. 
 
The First Charge: Not Radical Enough 
 
Caputo has argued in a number of essays 
and in several presentations that Kearney’s 
diacritical hermeneutics, along with Ric-
oeur’s reflective hermeneutics, is simply not 
radical enough to twist free from the meta-
physics of presence. He has made his case 
against Ricoeur as early as Radical Herme-
neutics (Caputo, 1984) and has expanded it 
to include Kearney in his more recent work 
(Caputo, 2006, 2010, 2011). Incidentally, I 
note that he is not the only Derridean to ar-
gue that Ricoeur failed to meet the challenge 
posed by the metaphysics of presence. To 
mention but one other prominent scholar on 
Derrida who has addressed the relation of 
Ricoeur and Derrida one could look to 
Leonard Lawlor’s work (1992).5 This line of 
critique, then, broaches a deep tension be-
tween Derrida and Ricoeur, indeed to my 
mind, it broaches one of the most fundamen-
tal disagreements in contemporary Conti-
nental philosophy, and I shall gesture in that 
direction below (section 3). Nevertheless, I 
begin with the Derridean criticism. 
  
Caputo’s most recent argument is that 
the structure of Kearney and Ricoeur’s her-
meneutics, whether diacritical or reflective, 
is too Hegelian to countenance the possibil-
ity of events, and this is important because if 
correct, this means that Kearney and Ric-
oeur alike are committed to the metaphysics 
of presence.6 To recall, should that commit-
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ment turn out to be correct, then their pro-
posed solutions to the problem of nihilism, 
and in particular their conceptions of God, 
would turn out to be part of that same prob-
lematic history. Specifically, in response to 
Kearney’s most recent attempt to find a way 
to mediate between theism and atheism in 
Anatheism (Kearney, 2010) Caputo wrote: 
 
Of course, Richard Kearney is interested 
in hermeneutics, not Hegelian metaphys-
ics, but the question is whether 
[Kearney’s] diacritical hermeneutics 
does not have a Hegelian imprint. Are 
not Hegel and Kearney both writing their 
own de Trinitate? In a hermeneutics 
more radically conceived [i.e., Caputo’s 
own], where things are deeply at risk, 
belief and unbelief are not parts or mo-
ments in or in any way contributors to a 
third position one step removed. Their 
momentum is never allowed to unfold or 
even get off the ground. … Instead of 
1,2,3 we encounter the innumerable. The 
binary of theism and atheism is dis-
placed, has not earned the right to recon-
ciliation.…this is not simply a “negative” 
operation, for the displacement of these 
“positions” exposes a more radical “af-
firmation,” a risky affirmation, a hope 
against hope, which is inscribed in a 
more fundamental undecidability that 
bests both of them. (Caputo, 2011, p. 62) 
 
Caputo’s argument is thus that Kearney and 
Ricoeur both retain a certain Hegelian struc-
ture in their thought, that they are “closet 
Hegelian[s]” (Caputo, 2011, p. 61). Ca-
puto’s own Derridean position, by contrast, 
avoids the metaphysics of presence because 
it remains open to a “risky” possibility; it is 
open to the notion that being/reality is not to 
be understood entirely in terms of presence, 
but also in terms of events, or radically un-
predictable reconfigurations of being. 
 
Kearney and Ricoeur’s Hegelianism is 
problematic not because it forecloses certain 
risks - why should one value riskiness for its 
own sake? - but because in that foreclosure 
of risk, this structure of thinking has no 
place for events, no place for the “perhaps” 
that escapes the metaphysics of presence, 
the “perhaps” that “is the necessary condi-
tion of possibility of every experience which 
is truly an ‘experience,’ which means that it 
arises from the unpredictable otherness of 
the future and shatters our horizons of ex-
pectation, which is what [Derrida] means by 
the possibility of the impossible” (Caputo, 
2011, p. 59). This “perhaps,” this possibility 
of impossibility, is just the Derridean con-
cept of event: “[t]here the word peut-être 
cuts deeply into the name of God, so that 
God is in the very element of the peut-être, 
the ‘event’ of the promise which is no less a 
promise/threat, of the maybe which is also a 
maybe not” (Caputo, 2011, p. 59).   
 
In short, Kearney and Ricoeur are not 
radical enough for the following reasons: 
they retain a Hegelian structure to their 
thought, and that structure forecloses the 
possibility of the event, yet one must remain 
open to the event, because it is only in this 
way that one can avoid commitment to the 
metaphysics of presence. 
 
The Second Charge: Crypto-Metaphysics 
 
The charge that Kearney and Ricoeur are 
closet Hegelians might be one way to argue 
that they are crypto-metaphysicians, but 
when Caputo levels this charge against 
Kearney in particular, he has something 
more specific in mind. In The God Who May 
Be (Kearney, 2001), Kearney’s goal is to 
mediate between the metaphysical concep-
tion of God understood, as Aquinas wrote, 
as ipsum esse per se subsistens, and the 
more personal, eschatological God of the 
prophets in the Bible, the God of Abraham 
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and Issac, even Jesus, who seems to be little 
encumbered with metaphysical terminology. 
He does this by reconceiving God in terms 
of a sense of possibility beyond, or more 
profound than, the metaphysical alternatives 
of potency and act, that is to say, he recon-
ceives God in terms of posse. Given this aim, 
Caputo argues that there is no real incompat-
ibility between the two conceptions, and that 
Kearney’s “posse” thus turns out to do no 
more than “update” traditional scholastic 
accounts of God. Caputo wrote: 
 
It seems to me that there is no real in-
compatibility between the eschatological 
and the metaphysical concepts of God 
which Richard distinguishes. There is no 
reason that God as such, God quoad se, 
as Aquinas would put it, or God “an 
sich,” as Kant would put it, could not al-
so be pure act, actus purus, the God who 
“is” through and through without a trace 
of potency, while God quoad nos, or für 
uns, God in terms of our experience of 
God in time and history, is the God who 
may be. …. Exactly how far is diacritical 
from dialectical? (Caputo, 2011, p. 59) 
  
For Caputo, none of Kearney’s ideas are 
open to the maybe/maybe not, the peut-être 
of God as event, as khora. As a result, when 
Kearney proposes a new concept, such as 
“posse,” he is not twisting free from a meta-
physical approach to God, from the meta-
physics of presence, he is simply “updating 
it,” by providing another list of qualities that 
would presumably stand alongside Thom-
as’s categories. Even though he claims to be 
going beyond metaphysics, then, he is really 
just doing a more modern form of it. 
 
The Third Charge: Foreclosing Ethics 
 
The final charge, which one finds in both 
Caputo and Dooley’s essays, is that the way 
in which Kearney attempts to mediate posi-
tions, his call for ethical discernment, fore-
closes the more radical ethics to which de-
construction remains open, to which any 
philosophy that escapes the metaphysics of 
presence must remain open. Caputo put it as 
follows: 
 
Richard takes up this question of the 
“monstrous” name of khora in Strangers, 
Gods, and Monsters, where I think his 
complaint is that when all is said and 
done khora cannot be trusted. But that I 
think is precisely what the poetics of the 
im/possible implies, that the conditions 
under which we trust also undermine our 
trust, so that trust is trust in a radical 
“perhaps,” a God who may or may not 
be, who may or may not be trusted, 
which is after all what “perhaps” must 
surely mean, even as a trust that is com-
pletely trustworthy is no trust at all but a 
surety. (Caputo, 2011, p. 60) 
 
Dooley understands Kearney in a similar 
way. He characterizes Kearney’s criticism of 
postmodernism, of deconstruction, in this 
way: when “one opts for the postmodern 
suspension of the ‘appearance-reality dis-
tinction,’ one leaves oneself without scope 
to judge between good and bad. Once, in 
other words, one abolishes all notions of ref-
erence and representation, one succumbs to 
‘narrative irresponsibility’ since one cannot 
differentiate good from bad narratives” 
(Dooley, 2007, p. 161). Yet, like Caputo, 
Dooley argues that by remaining committed 
to ideas such as “reference” or “representa-
tion” Kearney “remains captive, in spite of 
himself, to a view of the self and the world 
that is residually ‘foundational’” (Dooley, 
2007, p. 166). The foundation in this case 
ought to be understood as some form of eth-
ical presence, a certainty, an unrisky, une-
ventful, definitely the case and not a per-
haps/perhaps not.   
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To sum up: Kearney’s ethical imagina-
tion remains ethical only in the pale, bland, 
metaphysical way, along with all the other 
concepts he has developed, and though he 
has tried to think beyond the metaphysics of 
presence, despite himself, he always ends up 
slipping back into it. Furthermore, it is pre-
cisely his idea (the very idea) of ethical dis-
cernment between good and bad that pre-
vents him from recognizing the more radical 
demands of a possible ethics beyond, or at 
the limits of the metaphysics of presence. 
 
2. Ricoeur’s Reflective Hermeneutics 
 
My basic point is that Derrideans have simp-
ly failed to understand Kearney and the Ric-
oeurian pattern of thought (not Hegelian) 
that is present in his work. Once that pattern 
is illuminated, once it is understood on its 
own terms and not Derridean ones, it seems 
to me that the multiple ways in which their 
criticisms beg the question will be rather 
clear. I begin my defense, then, with a re-
construction of Ricoeur’s thought and the 
pattern at work in it in order to illuminate 
what Kearney draws from his thought. 
 
In his late exchange with the neuroscien-
tist Jean-Pierre Changeaux, Ricoeur gives us 
the key to understanding the continuity of 
his thought. There, he suggests that phe-
nomenology and hermeneutics form only 
two parts of his three-part method, stating: 
“I want to make my position clear at the out-
set. I am a partisan of a current of European 
philosophy that contains three distinctive 
approaches, typically referred to as ‘reflec-
tive philosophy,’ ‘phenomenology,’ and 
‘hermeneutics’” (Ricoeur, 2000, p. 4). In 
fact, it is Ricoeur’s commitment to reflective 
philosophy that enables him to unify phe-
nomenology and hermeneutics, to graft the 
branch of the latter onto the tree of the for-
mer. It is because philosophical reflection 
plays this unifying role that I believe his 
kind of hermeneutics is most aptly titled a 
reflective hermeneutics. 
 
When viewed in this light, one sees that 
Ricoeur’s central methodological piece is 
one on the philosophy of reflection, specifi-
cally his essay “Nabert on Act and Sign” 
(Ricoeur 1972).  The central points for Ric-
oeur’s thought are the following. Nabert ar-
gues (at least as Ricoeur interprets him) that 
there is a distinction between conscious acts 
and the representation of those conscious 
acts in signs. There is a difference between, 
for example, perceiving the coffee mug on 
my desk and stating: “there is a coffee mug 
on my desk.” The latter case represents the 
conscious act by way of signs. Nabert, how-
ever, does not understand this representation 
of conscious acts in signs as an impediment 
to knowledge, since they rather complete 
(aufhebet) the conscious acts, enriching 
them with a sense they did not and could not 
have on their own. Representation by signs, 
then, becomes a necessary form of media-
tion on the way to knowledge, rather than an 
impediment. At this point, when one recog-
nizes the productive role of the signifying 
representation of conscious acts, one has 
begun on the arc of philosophical reflection. 
Signs call out for interpretation; they are not 
always self-evident. Hermeneutics, under-
stood as the art of interpretation, thus be-
comes constitutive of reflective philosophy. 
In this way it is elevated from a regional 
discipline, which addressed sacred texts, to 
one of general philosophical import.   
 
This approach makes Ricoeur’s herme-
neutics fundamentally different from either 
Heidegger’s or Gadamer’s insofar as he does 
not attempt to “dig under” the ontical disci-
plines, such as logic, mathematics, or sci-
ence - in particular linguistics - but instead 
attempts to traverse them. His reflective 
hermeneutics is not about a fundamental 
pre-understanding, a horizion or back-drop 
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of understanding that needs to be in place in 
order to make sense of those sciences.  Re-
flective hermeneutics is instead posterior to 
the sciences, rather than prior, for it is the 
conflict of interpretations among these re-
gional disciplines that gives rise to the need 
for hermeneutics.  One reflects on these con-
flicts in order to complete one’s intentional 
conscious experience. How that interpreta-
tion is to be carried out, and how it is to be 
related, tested, with respect to the original 
phenomenological evidence are the ques-
tions that formed the task of Ricoeur’s intel-
lectual career. 
 
A caveat is necessary at this point in or-
der to understand one of Kearney’s more 
significant departures from Ricoeur. Ric-
oeur’s understanding of phenomenology was 
such that he never agreed with Levinas that 
the Other, the experience of the second-
person intention, maintained priority over 
one’s first-person conscious experience. In 
his late The Course of Recognition, Ricoeur 
addresses the relation of Husserl to Levinas 
as follows: 
 
One version, that of Husserl in his Car-
tesian Meditations, remains a phenome-
nology of perception. In this sense, his 
approach is theoretical. The other, that of 
Levinas, in Totality and Infinity and 
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Es-
sence, is straightforwardly ethical and, 
by implication, anti-ontological. Both 
approaches have their legitimacy, and 
my argument here does not require us to 
decide in favor of one or the other of 
them. (Ricoeur, 2005, p. 154) 
 
For Ricoeur, the opposition is one that re-
sults from a choice about methodological 
origin, and could not be decided simply by 
averting to the phenomena. Below I review 
Kearney’s significant departure from Ric-
oeur on this matter. 
Returning to the general schema of Ric-
oeur’s thought, one notes that the result of 
these methodological commitments is that 
the hermeneutic arc of any of Ricoeur’s in-
vestigations is sustained by reflecting on a 
specific kind of meaning, and in the course 
of his career he provided three specific 
models of such meaning: the symbol, the 
text, and translation. I shall not here pursue 
the details of all these models, because it is 
only the model of translation that is neces-
sary for understanding Kearney’s sense of a 
possible God - God as posse. 
  
In his brief work entitled On Translation, 
Ricoeur stated that the problem of transla-
tion may be taken in two ways: “either take 
the term ‘translation’ in the strict sense of 
the transfer of a spoken message from one 
language to another or take it in the broad 
sense as synonymous with the interpretation 
of any meaningful whole within the same 
speech community” (Ricoeur, 2006, p. 11). 
There is a specific point concerning transla-
tion in the narrow sense that is pertinent to 
translation in the wider sense, namely the 
“construction of comparables” (Ricoeur, 
2006, p. 34).  After one gives up the Roman-
tic ideal of perfect translation, it is possible 
to recognize that it is the work of translation 
that establishes the equivalent terms be-
tween languages. Ricoeur’s paradigm case 
in this regard is established by reflecting on 
the French sinologist François Jullien, who 
argues “that Chinese is the absolute other of 
Greek - that knowledge of the inside of Chi-
nese amounts to a deconstruction of what is 
outside, of what is exterior, i.e. thinking and 
speaking Greek” (Ricoeur, 2006, p. 36). 
Ricoeur does not dispute Jullien’s point, but 
rather points out that in order to make his 
case, Jullien must engage in a construction 
of equivalent but not identical terms, espe-
cially with regard to the tenses (or lack 
thereof) of Chinese verbs. This construction 
is just what Ricoeur means by the construc-
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tion of comparables. Moving across (trans-
latum) from one untranslatable language to 
another is made practically possible by the 
construction of comparable, though not 
identical, terms, by an equivalence without 
identity.  Ricoeur takes this as a general 
hermeneutic method of reflection for relat-
ing, without equating, two mutually incom-
patible domains of sense, such as cultural 
and personal memory, or (as Kearney pur-
sues) Christian and Hindu conceptions of 
God. 
 
This traversal through the conflict of in-
terpretations, especially by means of the 
model of translation, sets up Ricoeur’s ap-
proach to metaphysics. This terminal point 
in Ricoeur’s hermeneutic arc is import, since 
I need to demonstrate that Ricoeur was in 
fact a metaphysical philosopher and not just 
a philosopher of language in order to re-
spond to the Derridean charge that Ricoeur 
and Kearney could not avoid being meta-
physicians of presence, since they only ever 
discuss linguistic meaning. Ricoeur always 
maintained that in order to complete the arc 
of hermeneutical reflection it was necessary 
not only to travers the existing conflicts of 
interpretation, but to take the results back to 
their ontological root, to follow the referent 
of the symbols, metaphors, texts, and trans-
lations back to being itself. In principle, this 
sort of project could address any form of 
being, so that the arc of reflection could be 
completed by returning to the being indicat-
ed by physical or mathematical equations. 
Don Ihde has, for example, shown how Ric-
oeur’s approach to hermeneutics lends itself 
quite fruitfully to an analysis of contempo-
rary science and technology (see Idhe, 1993, 
1998). That domain of investigation, how-
ever, was not Ricoeur’s concern. Rather, 
since the very beginning of his work, he was 
concerned with the ontology of human be-
ings, with elaborating a philosophical an-
thropology. It is for this reason that the kind 
of being Ricoeur was interested in was being 
as capability. In Memory, History, Forget-
ting he puts it thus: 
 
as we read in Aristotle’s well-known 
declaration in Metaphysics 4.2: “There 
are many sense in which a thing may be 
said to be.” I have argued elsewhere on 
the basis of this Aristotelian warning in 
exploring the resources of the interpreta-
tion that, among the various acceptations, 
privileges that being as act and as power 
on the plane of a philosophical anthro-
pology: it is in this way that I propose in 
the course of the present chapter to hold 
“the power to remember” (le pouvoir 
faire mémoire) to be one of these powers 
- along with the power to speak, the 
power to act, the power to recount, the 
power to be imputable with respect to 
one’s actions as their genuine author. 
(Ricoeur, 2004, p. 343-344) 
 
In his work on recognition, Ricoeur adds 
a sixth power to the list: the power to recog-
nize and be recognized. This last is a sort of 
meta-capability, since it is by mutually rec-
ognizing one another that one in fact devel-
ops capacities. “[I]t is a question,” Ricoeur 
writes, “of seeking in the development of 
conflictual interactions the source for a par-
allel enlargening of the individual capacities” 
(Ricoeur, 2005, p. 187). This six-fold list is 
Ricoeur’s response to Heidegger’s existen-
tials in Being and Time and his correction of 
the Kantian categories, since in the former 
case, Ricoeur maintains that Heidegger’s 
account remains untested by the conflict of 
interpretations, and in the latter, one must 
note that none of these capacities may be 
understood to apply to natural beings, such 
as rocks or trees, so that Kant’s categories 
prove to be far too broad to correctly expli-
cate the human condition. They thus stand as 
a significant contribution to the ontology of 
our human condition, and prove equally that 
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Ricoeur’s reflective hermeneutics does ad-
dress being and not just language. I now turn 
to develop how this ontology escapes the 
legacy of the metaphysics of presence. 
 
3. Not Radical Enough? 
 
One of the basic criticisms of Ricoeur and 
Kearney’s hermeneutics is that it is not radi-
cal enough, that it is not open to the event, 
the unforeseeable, unpredictable, impossible 
possibility.  This charge, then, amounts to 
the point that any hermeneutics following a 
Ricoeurian structure is too Hegelian (which 
is a point of contact I have provocatively 
courted in the foregoing) to twist-free from 
the metaphysics of presence. Having pre-
sented the foregoing on Ricoeur, it seems to 
me that I could respond to this charge in ei-
ther of two ways: by means of what might 
be called an Adequate Account Argument, 
or by means of a similar Adequate Inference 
Argument. By these arguments I intend the 
following. 
 
Adequate Account Argument: This is the 
stronger of the two responses. It argues 
that in the contemporary discourse of 
Continental philosophy there are two 
broad accounts of events: one, the Der-
ridean-Heideggerian account, has two 
parts, and one, which Ricoeur, Kearney 
and others (including most notably Alain 
Badiou) maintain, which has three parts. 
Next, it argues that the two-part account 
is unworkable, but the three-part account 
is not. This argument, in short, seeks 
both to establish what an adequate ac-
count of events would look like, and that 
the Derridean conception is inadequate 
given those criteria, while the Ricoeurian 
conception is adequate. Hence the title: 
it is an argument about which account of 
events is most adequate, given the 
shared aim of twisting-free from the 
metaphysics of presence. 
Adequate Inference Argument: This is 
the weaker of the two responses. It ar-
gues that there are, in the contemporary 
discourse of Continental philosophy, two 
broad accounts of events. One of these, 
the Derridean-Heideggerian, has a two-
part structure, while another, the Ric-
oeurian (and Kearneyan, and Badiousi-
an), has a three-part structure. Next, ra-
ther than settle which side has a better 
conception of events, the argument 
moves to establish the weaker claim that 
it is unwarranted simply to presuppose 
that one account is correct and then 
charge the other side with failing to con-
form to one’s presupposition. To do so 
would be to engage, rather straightfor-
wardly, in begging the question. Yet, 
when Caputo, or Lawlor, or Dooley ac-
cuse Ricoeur or Kearney of failing to be 
sufficiently radical, their argument 
amounts just to the charge that Ricoeur 
and Kearney’s conception of events does 
not conform to the two-part structure one 
finds in Derrida’s thought. In doing so, 
as a result, they beg the question, since 
what needs to be established is whether 
that conception of events is the correct 
one. To sum up, this argument concerns 
the (in)adequacy of the Derridean’s in-
ferences, while the former is an argu-
ment about the (in)adequacy of the Der-
ridean account of events. 
 
While I maintain that the conclusions of 
the Adequate Account Argument are war-
ranted,7 establishing that claim is both more 
involved than the space I have available for 
the present essay, and it is something that I 
have already explored (to some extent at 
least) in some of my other pieces.8 For the 
present essay, then, I think it is enough to 
make the case for the Adequate Inference 
Argument. The character of the present de-
fense, as a result, leaves one with a choice 
between two approaches to events, to God 
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even, but I do not think that this decision is 
one that is groundless, or one that will re-
main unresolved. Rather it looks to me as 
though a new field for research is opened, 
and that some fruitful discussion is likely to 
follow.  For the present, I content myself 
with making the case that there is a need for 
this discussion. 
 
In order to make my case, I begin with 
the point that is common to both alternatives, 
namely that in the contemporary discourse 
of Continental philosophy there are two 
broad accounts of events. Since Derrideans 
have overlooked or misunderstood the alter-
native account, the one found in Ricoeur’s 
thought, I begin with it. 
 
In the conclusion to The Symbolism of 
Evil (Ricoeur 1967), a relatively early work, 
Ricoeur outlined a three part process for the 
recovery of symbols.   
 
[i] I wager that I shall have a better un-
derstanding of man and of the bond be-
tween the being of man and the being of 
all beings if I follow the indication of 
symbolic thought. That wager then be-
comes [ii] the task of verifying my wager 
and saturating it, so to speak, with intel-
ligibility. In return, the task [iii] trans-
forms my wager: in betting on the signif-
icance of the symbolic world, I bet at the 
same time that my wager will be re-
stored to me in the power of reflection, 
in the element of coherent discourse. 
(Ricoeur, 1967, p. 355) 
 
To summarize, the process has three parts: a 
wager, verification, and transformation. 
 
The wager itself is a wager on symbolic 
meaning, that is to say, meaning that is not 
present in the semantics of ordinary, dic-
tionary sense. To use a little terminology 
from Alain Badiou, symbolic meaning “in-
exists” in the structure of sense; it exists in 
the structure of univocal semantics precisely 
as that which is excluded from it (Badiou, 
2009, p. 153). Because it does not clearly 
exist as something literally meaningful, be-
cause one can imagine logical positivists 
dismissing the investigation of “evil” in the 
Bible as nonsense, one must wager that it 
does exist. Second, one must act, one must 
do something to bring about this meaning, 
and this is the process of verification. The 
long detour through the conflict of interpre-
tations just is this process of verification, of 
truth-making. Finally, if successful, this pro-
cess will have brought a new kind of mean-
ing into existence, so that my wager is trans-
formed, so that the world of dictionary sense 
is displaced. This is a structure that Ricoeur 
maintains for all his models of sense; it 
holds just as much for the new sense provid-
ed by symbols as it does for that provided by 
texts, or for that provided by translation. At 
the same time, because it is always possible 
to follow the referent of any sign to its onto-
logical base, each of these ruptures in the 
established order of sense, (symbolically, 
textually, translatively) is at the same time a 
rupture in the order of being. In each case, 
utterly new and unpredictable forms of 
meaning and being are brought fourth. They 
are, in short, events. What this structure de-
scribes, then, is just how events occur and 
are completed. It is this three-part structure 
(wager, verification, and transformation), 
which moves through representations rather 
than trying to subvert, “dig under,” or dis-
place them, that is intended by the “infinite” 
structure of events. 
 
Derridean (radically finite) events, by 
contrast, have only two parts. The first of 
these is the recognition of an in-existent, the 
structure of included exclusion, Heidegger’s 
no-thing, Derrida’s supplement, in the struc-
ture of signification. Next one takes a step to 
the recognition of something “beyond,” 
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something “older” than the supplement, 
“‘older’ than presence and the system of 
truth, older than ‘history’” (Derrida 1973, p. 
103). Or in Derrida’s later work, one comes 
to recognize the surprise of the incoming of 
the Other, of the unpredictable, im-possible, 
unforseable, radical break in meaning and 
being that is an event (Heidegger’s Ereignis). 
One does not verify the event, for Derrida, 
since to do so would be to presuppose what 
the event was, to reduce its riskiness by 
naming it, and thereby betraying its very 
character as an event. 
 
Where Ricoeur’s account differs from 
the Derridean account of events concerns the 
role of agency. For Derrideans, Ricoeur’s 
(or Kearney’s, or Badiou’s) mediations are 
an attempt to gain control over the unpre-
dictability of events, to lessen their riskiness. 
Yet for Ricoeur, events simply do not come 
into being on their own - or at least not all of 
them.9 For human events, and for the as-
sessing (the working-through) of non-human 
events, a certain kind of agency is necessary 
to foster their transformation - this is the 
process of verification, of truth-making.  
Mediation completes the events, not by 
bringing them into some higher dialectical 
synthesis, but by allowing them to happen - 
this is the Ricoeurian sense of “Aufhebung.” 
One might say, then, that more risk is in-
volved in Ricoeur’s approach to events than 
Derrida’s, since in Ricoeur’s approach one 
must commit oneself to the fostering, to the 
be-coming of events, while in Derrida’s ap-
proach, one only tries to prepare the way to 
the recognition of the radical unpredictabil-
ity of their occurrence - no agency is neces-
sary to make them happen. To put it another 
way: for Derrida, the risk involved with 
events concerns their unknowability, in as-
senting to a radically unknown, for Ricoeur 
the risk involved with events concerns one’s 
own actions, concerns acting on behalf of an 
unknown. 
One account of events has two parts, 
then, another three parts. Both are commit-
ted to the twisting-free from the metaphysics 
of presence, but each attempts to do so in 
different ways. I do think that Ricoeur’s ap-
proach is the only workable one, but the 
foregoing suggests a more modest conclu-
sion: that Derrideans cannot charge Ric-
oeurians of being insufficiently radical, 
measured by their own standards, when it is 
the adequacy of their standard that is the 
point of contention. In a similar way, they 
cannot accuse Ricoeurians of shirking from 
risk, when the sense of “risk” is the point of 
contention. In short, their argument presup-
poses their point of view’s correctness in 
order to make its claim, but it is their pre-
suppositions that have yet to be established. 
The charge of insufficient radicality, as a 
result, does not appear to be sustainable, ei-
ther for Ricoeur or Kearney, since both are 
committed to this three-part structure. 
 
4. Diacritical Hermeneutics 
 
While I have spent some time reviewing 
Ricoeur’s thought, with the intention of de-
fending Kearney’s work, one should not un-
derstand Kearney to be engaged some sort 
of application of Ricoeur’s general princi-
ples. What Kearney accepts from Ricoeur is 
two-fold: a commitment to a three-fold 
structure for events (which he shares as 
much with Badiou as he does with Ricoeur), 
and the way that Ricoeur “grafts” hermeneu-
tics onto phenomenology, namely by begin-
ning with phenomenological consciousness, 
moving through a conflict of interpretations, 
and then returning to a refigured conscious-
ness. His disagreements are at least three-
fold: he entirely re-characterizes the arc of 
hermeneutic reflection, he broadens Ric-
oeur’s account of narrative, and he redresses 
Ricoeur’s l’homme capable by introducing 
the capacity for eros. Any of these points, I 
believe, put him rather deeply at odds with 
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Ricoeurians, and as one will note, they are 
mutually interdependent claims. 
 
Kearney’s general correction of Ric-
oeur’s reflective hermeneutics consists in 
the argument that the choice between 
Levinas and Husserl on the priority of the 
Other is not merely a matter of methodolog-
ical origin, as Ricoeur maintained.10 For 
Kearney, Levinas was right in one capital 
sense: the presence of the Other disrupts 
first-person consciousness in an irreducible, 
irrecoverable way: “[t]he rejection of rela-
tive otherness in favor of absolute otherness, 
by Levinas and other thinkers of radical al-
terity, marks a decisive ‘break’ between 
thought and language” (Kearney, 2003, p. 
16). Furthermore, once acknowledged, this 
break, this disruption of consciousness and 
language indicates that one has a respons-
ability to the Other, a capacity for ethical 
response. Kearney wrote: “[t]he basic aim of 
diacritical hermeneutics is, I suggest, to 
make us more hospitable to strangers, gods 
and monsters without succumbing to mys-
tique or madness” (Kearney, 2003, p. 18). 
Ricoeur, of course, recognizes one’s capaci-
ty for moral imputation as one of the basic 
capabilities of human beings, but Kearney 
draws a deeper lesson from Levinas. What 
Levinas’ phenomenologies indicate for 
Kearney is that one does not begin only with 
phenomenological consciousness, which 
must then pass through the conflict of inter-
pretations, so that it can finally return to 
some ontological dimension. Rather, one 
begins with an ethical, phenomenological 
consciousness, which gives rise to a conflict 
of interpretations, and returns to an ontology. 
The trajectory of hermeneutic reflection, 
then, is sustained from beginning to end by 
an ethical obligation. One cannot, as a result, 
mediate among conflicting interpretations by 
simple appeal to rational or logical criteria. 
Rather, such mediation must always pass by 
way of an ethically evaluative moment. The 
criticism of dia-critical hermeneutics is sus-
tained, is completed, only by averting to the 
demands of an original ethical intention. 
 
This point has rather significant implica-
tions for the status of events for Kearney. 
While his thought still follows the “infinite” 
model of events by retaining a three-part 
structure, the agentive aspect of events for 
Kearney is always ethical. Veri-fication, 
what Ricoeur calls truth as attestation at cer-
tain points, is an ethical practice. One cannot 
divorce the most profound sense of truth 
from ethical activity. It is in this way that he 
maintains the Levinasian thesis that ethics is 
first philosophy, and he does so without the 
need to commit himself to some form of ab-
solute asymmetry, or “madness” as he puts it. 
For Ricoeur, a kind of rational completion of 
events allows them to happen, while for 
Kearney this completion (Aufhebung) is al-
ways ethical. 
 
My hope is that these points should clar-
ify how Kearney could respond to Dooley’s 
concern (the third charge) that Kearney is 
not open to the most profound call of ethics. 
Dooley sees a sort of “shrinking back from 
the abyss” in Kearney’s insistence that me-
diation, that completion, of opposed posi-
tions in the conflict of interpretation always 
remain subordinated to an ethical intention. 
God might be monstrous after all, and so 
could the stranger, he seems to suggest. Yet, 
in making such an argument, Dooley is 
clearly presupposing the Derridean two-part 
account of events, wherein the greatest chal-
lenge, the greatest risk, concerns assenting 
to an utterly unknowable. For Kearney, the 
risk of response requires agency, and this 
agency is only possible by living together, 
by our respons-ability, and so is only possi-
ble in a broadly ethical way. Kearney’s eth-
ics, then, in no way forecloses the most pro-
found challenges of ethical response, but 
rather it opens a way to it. 
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Even with this rather substantial modi-
fication to Ricoeur’s thought, Kearney inno-
vates in other significant ways. To begin, his 
general correction of Ricoeur’s hermeneu-
tics results in a process of hermeneutical 
thought that at a more specific level acts as 
if it were a correction of Ricoeur’s model of 
translation. I write that it acts “as if” it were 
a correction of the translative model, since 
Kearney developed his own account before 
Ricoeur completed his account of translation. 
The “correction” that I suggest, then, is for 
the sake of illustration, and so is warranted 
only by its ability to illuminate the signifi-
cance of Kearney’s departure Ricoeur. One 
may think of it in the following way. In both 
The God Who May Be and Anatheism, 
Kearney undertakes to mediate hermeneuti-
cally (diacritically) between two seemingly 
untranslatable poles: in the former case, he 
mediates between the scholastic conception 
of God as ipsum esse subsistens (Thomas 
Aquinas’ interpretation of Exodus 3:14 - “I 
am who am”) and new eschatological con-
ceptions, while in the latter case, he medi-
ates between a naïve theism and a postmod-
ern atheism. The work of these works con-
sists in something like the construction of 
comparables, in the construction of an 
equivalence without identity. In the former 
case, the comparable term that Kearney con-
structs is God understood as posse, while in 
the latter it is, quite obviously, anatheism 
(Kearney, 2003, p. 98; Kearney, 2010, p. 6). 
Incidentally, one might note that Kearney 
has taken a similar approach in his Hosting 
The Stranger (Kearney & Taylor, 2011) col-
lection, in which the Latin “hostis,” meaning 
both guest and host, becomes the compara-
ble term for translating between untranslata-
ble and irreconcilable cultural differences, 
such as the opposition between Israelis and 
Palestinians. 
 
This analogy with Ricoeur’s thought, 
however, only carries one so far, since 
Kearney is not content simply to construct a 
term that functions as an equivalence with-
out identity. Although he does provide spe-
cific terms, such as posse or anatheism, to 
identify his projects, what Kearney in fact 
designates by these terms is a comparable 
narrative. Unlike Ricoeur, Kearney main-
tains that narratives are their own model of 
sense - they are not simply a form of textual 
meaning as Ricoeur thinks. It is just this 
point that Kearney explores in On Stories 
(Kearney 2002), which is part of the trilogy 
that includes The God Who May Be 
(Kearney 2001) and Strangers, Gods, and 
Monsters (Kearney 2003). It is by mediating 
irreconcilable narratives, by translating them, 
that Kearney undertakes to reconcile (with-
out identifying or synthesizing) opposed re-
ligious traditions, or even theists and atheists. 
It is in this sense that Kearney’s religious, 
diacritical hermeneutics, which consists of 
constructing comparable narratives between 
untranslatable positions, and which is al-
ways carried out by means of the ethical 
demand, may be considered a project that 
aims at translating God. 
 
A third and final significant departure 
from Ricoeur’s thought that I see in 
Kearney’s work concerns the role of desire, 
of eros. It is a remarkable point that among 
Ricoeur’s fundamental human capabilities 
he does not include the capacity for eros or 
love more generally.  Yet, since Kearney is 
committed to the Levinasian point that the 
ethical intention fundamentally transforms 
one’s phenomenal consciousness, and be-
cause Levinas maintained that eros was one 
of the ways to try to complete this ethical 
intention, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
Kearney would move to include eros as a 
fundamental feature of our ethical responsi-
bility. The centrality of eros to Kearney’s 
thought is something that Patrick Burke has 
identified (Burke, 2011), and it is a point 
with which Kearney has explicitly agreed 
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(Kearney, 2011a). Despite his commitments 
to Levinas, however, Kearney does not de-
velop his account of eros in a Levinasian 
way. 
 
While Kearney has explored the topic of 
eros in a number of ways, what I think is 
most important for the present essay is the 
way in which eros functions for him as a 
model for ethical discernment without for-
mal criteria.11 In the tradition of virtue ethics 
it is the phronimos, the man of practical 
wisdom, who is able to make discerning 
judgments without formal criteria. For 
Kearney, it is the lover. One of the more 
significant differences between these two 
sorts of person is the way in which the lover 
is open to excessive actions that the man of 
practical wisdom’s moderation would not 
allow. Nowhere is this point clearer than in 
Kearney’s analysis of the Shulamite woman 
in the Song of Songs. This biblical chant us-
es powerfully charged erotic imagery.  
Kearney wrote: 
 
the amorous verses [defy] any purely al-
legorical interpretation: “his left arm is 
under my head and his right makes love 
to me (2:6 and 8:2); he “pastures his 
flock” among the lilies (6:3); his “foun-
tain makes the garden fertile” (4:15); or 
“my beloved thrust his hand/through the 
hole in the door; / I trembled to the core 
of my being” (5:4). Doesn’t get much 
hotter than that. …This kind of language 
was, according to André LaCocque, al-
most unprecedented in the bible. And it 
was to prove so controversial in the later 
rabbinical and Christian monastic tradi-
tions as to be frequently laundered, chas-
tened, or censored. (Kearney, 2003, p. 
56) 
 
Yet it is not only that the language is one 
that courts excess, nor is it even the case that 
this biblical chant is a woman’s song, above 
all Kearney argues: “the Shulamite’s passion 
represents free love—she is faithful to her 
lover ‘outside matrimonial bonds and social 
demands’ (e.g., demands to remain a servant, 
wife, child-bearer, mother, or commercial 
exchange object)” (Kearney 2003, p. 57). 
The lover is thus a model for ethical dis-
cernment without formal criteria because in 
a loving relation one responds automatically, 
without thinking, to the needs, the demands 
of one’s beloved. In the loving relation, one 
has no need either of deontological univer-
salizing criteria or a list of Ten Command-
ments (love your beloved is not one of 
them!).  At the same time, this kind of re-
sponse knows no boundaries. It would seem 
to go against the very nature of love to re-
quire moderation in response to one’s be-
loved. Love is an overflowing excess 
through and through, and this is why it may 
seem to be an appropriate model for a hu-
mans relation to God. Additionally, one 
notes, it is only this kind of excessive ethics, 
an ethics modeled on eros, that would seem 
to be appropriate to the agency required to 
complete an event of meaning - a moderate 
ethics, closed both to the excesses and fra-
gility of love, would not appear to be up to 
the task of response to utterly new breaks in 
meaning and being. 
 
These points, I believe, demonstrate why 
Kearney is not a crypto-metaphysician, why 
his account of God as posse is not a simple 
“update” to scholastic conceptions of God. 
Caputo was concerned that such a concep-
tion of God was not open to the horizon 
shattering possibility of the event, the riski-
ness of the “perhaps” of God. Yet this point 
again presupposes his Derridean commit-
ments. Kearney’s God as posse is possible in 
more than one sense, but I think most pro-
foundly insofar as the meaning of this God 
as posse inexists in our contemporary 
(Christian) religious traditions. Kearney’s 
posse is a mediating construction, a notion 
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of a God that he hopes to assist in bringing 
to completion, to articulate by translating the 
narratives on God in both metaphysical and 
postmodern conditions, even theists and 
atheists. Furthermore, the character of this 
God is one that is to be discerned ethically, 
following the model of erotic demand, fol-
lowing the way of the Shulamite woman - 
not following formal codes or moral rules. 
This is the God, probably, that he hopes for, 
and as a result this God remains only a pos-
sibility in just that sense.  This is not the 
God für uns, as opposed to an sich. It is a 
God, perhaps - if we can make sense of 
Him/Her/It, if we can make this kind of ex-
istence meaningful (though perhaps we will 
fail, and that is always a risk!). 
 
5. How to Life with/for a Possible God 
 
At this point, I hope to have made it reason-
ably clear why none of the charges against 
Kearney’s conception of God hit their mark. 
To argue, as the Derrideans do, that 
Kearney’s thought is (1) not radical enough, 
that (2) it is crypto-metaphysical, or that (3) 
it is closed to the most profound possibilities 
of ethics, is simply to misconstrue the char-
acter of Kearney and Ricoeur’s thought. 
Both of these thinkers maintain that herme-
neutics is a response to events of mean-
ing/being, and that this response has a three-
part structure: wagering, verifying, trans-
forming. This three-part structure is what I 
have been calling the structure of infinite 
thought, and I have opposed it to the struc-
ture of radical finitude, which the Derride-
ans defend.  Their sense of radical finitude 
turns on a conception of events that consist 
in the identification of an inexistent, and the 
recognition of the unpredictable to-come (a 
decision on the undecidable).  While I have 
not provided any grounds for evaluating the 
relative strengths of these competing con-
ceptions, the mere identification of two rival 
approaches is enough to demonstrate that the 
Derrideans’ criticisms are unfounded. Their 
arguments must presuppose the accuracy of 
just those points that are objects of dispute. 
 
A number of consequences follow for 
how one is to live in light of Kearney’s con-
ception of God as posse. The first of these 
connects with the broad concern of Conti-
nental philosophy: just how does this ac-
count respond to the problem of nihilism? 
Rather than assert that meaning enters the 
world through belief in some transcendent 
Being (the traditional, scholastic approach), 
Kearney’s approach accepts straightforward-
ly that the realm of sense described by natu-
ral science proscribes existential meaning. 
The sense of “God as posse” inexists in the 
order of being so understood, so that one 
gains access to its meaning only insofar as 
one sub-jects oneself to the God-event. In 
wagering on the sense of “posse” then, one 
twists-free from the tradition of the meta-
physics of presence by finding a space for 
existential meaning through the events of 
being. In short, being is not all there is, for 
there “are” also events, understood as the 
unpredictable shifts, happenings of being. 
 
Yet this approach to God does more than 
restore a form of existential meaning to the 
universe, which is also something that the 
Derridean account contends that it is able to 
do. For the sense of God as posse also pro-
vides a means by which to live - an ethics if 
not a rule-bound morality - for one must also 
act in order to bring about the happening of 
the event.  The exchanges between Kearney 
and Caputo have often centered on an anal-
ogy about opening doors.  Caputo argues 
that his account of events is radical insofar 
as it recognizes that in the case of God, 
one’s belief is like opening the door to one’s 
house without knowing who stands on the 
other side - it might be a friend or a murder-
er. Living before this mysterium tremendum 
et fascinans constitutes the life of the reli-
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gious believer, who cannot foreclose the 
possibility that God might be a monster. 
This analogy aptly characterizes the Der-
ridean account of events, since it has two 
crucial parts: an inexistent, in this case rep-
resented by the door, and the incoming of an 
unforeseeable possibility, the person/beast 
standing on the other side. The Kearneyan 
response is to suggest that the opening of the 
door is not something one does alone, that 
Caputo’s metaphor presupposes a kind of 
individualism. Events, he would respond, 
are only brought into being with others, so 
that when I open the door, I do so in relation 
to the other people in my household, those 
who have enabled me to live as I am. The 
opening itself, then, is a third part (the veri-
fication), without which the event does not 
happen. This basic difference concerning the 
character of events thus entails different 
ways of living. 
 
The event of God as posse, Kearney 
suggests, is sustained by the practice of love, 
including even erotic love. At its most pro-
found level, loving God as posse means that 
one must work actively to find better desig-
nations of God by translating incomparable 
narratives about God. This act of translation 
must be guided by an ethical commitment, 
since one only realizes an event with others 
and through one’s respons-ability to them. 
Unethical conceptions of God, monstrous 
conceptions, then, are proscribed because 
they arise from a conception of human liv-
ing, human intentional consciousness, that is 
abstract - one that assumes that individuals 
exist prior to the communities in which they 
live. None of this suggests that the ethics of 
a commitment to God as posse follows rules, 
for the basic point that is underscored is the 
need to trans-late incommensurable concep-
tions of God, incommensurable conceptions 
of the highest goal for our lives, and this 
must follow the model of love, which oper-
ates excessively, without criteria. As a result, 
the need for hermeneutic trans-lation defines 
the basic ethical character of our lives. For 
Kearney, we live in and through our herme-
neutic endeavors, in and through our at-
tempts to construct comparables between 
incomparable narratives, in and through the 
dissenting stories that people tell both in our 
own cultures and in those of others. 
 
I close these reflections with two brief 
indications for some further research that 
might follow from the foregoing. One of the 
more immediate consequences of the fore-
going argument is that it suggests a new area 
for research in the philosophy of religion. It 
seems to me that the tactic of radical finitude 
has been explored rather thoroughly in con-
temporary thought, in the work of Derride-
ans, such as Caputo, in Jean-Luc Marion’s 
conception of the doubly saturated phenom-
enon, or even those who have followed 
Heidegger, such as Jean-Yves Lacoste.12 
This alternative path, taking up the position 
of infinite thought, perhaps deserves more 
consideration.  Kearney’s way is one way to 
do so, but perhaps there are others. 
 
A second consequence suggests that 
more work needs to be undertaken to evalu-
ate the respective strengths of these posi-
tions. Given the shared aim of twisting-free 
from the metaphysics of presence, which 
account of events is most capable of achiev-
ing this aim? This point seems to me to be a 
general metaphysical problem, and one that 
concerns one of the most profound points of 
contention in that area. If the “theological 
turn” took place just for the reason that it 
seemed poised to test such points of profun-
dity, then perhaps it will continue to serve 
our thought well on this explicitly metaphys-
ical point. The other area that seems to be 
flourishing in contemporary Continental phi-
losophy is this so-called “speculative turn,” 
a field in which Badiou, Deleuze, and Žižek 
have established the existing contours. Per-
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haps a point of contact between these two 
discourses, one metaphysical and one theo-
logical, would be salutatory for both. At 
least for any theological conception moti-
vated by conceptions of possibility, this 
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1  See for example (Dawkins 2008), and 
(Hawking & Mlodinow 2010). 
 
2 There is, of course, considerable disagree-
ment concerning whether or not these spe-
cific thinkers ought to be included in this 
tradition, and if so, to what extent.  I men-
tion the matter here only because these 
thinkers have at various points been under-
stood to partake of that tradition, and be-
cause they serve an illustrative purpose as a 
result.  
 
3 For the specific places where these think-
ers endorse a sense of radical finitude, see 
the following.  For Agamben see his (1999a) 
and (1999b).  Heidegger’s commitment to 
finitude is well-known.  For what is one of 
the clearest essays on the character of his 
commitment see (Lawlor, 2004), and for a 
book-length study, one might look to (Stam-
baugh, 1992).  For Žižek’s straightforward 
commitment to finitude, see especially the 
“Introduction” to the co-authored (Gabriel & 
Žižek, 2009).  For the character of Badiou’s 
infinite thought, likely the best essays are 
included in (Badiou, 2008).  For the way in 
which Ricoeur and Kearney are committed 
to infinite thought, clearly it is the point of 
the present essay to make this case. 
 
4 Patrick Masterson, for example, has criti-
cized Kearney’s thought from a more tradi-
tional, metaphysical side in (Masterson, 
2008a; 2008b).   This criticism deserves 
more consideration than it receives in the 
present essay, but it seems to me to be less 
serious than the Derridean critique, since it 
does not entirely to share the aim of over-
coming the metaphysics of presence.  To my 
mind, then, while it is a form of criticism, it 
is not entirely an immanent one. 
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5 Lawlor makes a careful argument through-
out the whole work, but the concluding 
chapter crystalizes what he takes to be the 
significant difference between the thinkers. 
 
6 It should be noted that Caputo is here as-
suming the traditional understanding of He-
gel, as one finds exposited in Charles Tay-
lor’s account (Taylor, 1975).  On this under-
standing, Hegel is the metaphysician par 
excellence, and so most culpable for con-
tributing to the problem of nihilism. 
 
7 At least they seem to me to be warranted 
under the ordinary construals of Derrida on 
events, such as one finds in Caputo (1987, 
2010) or Marder (2011).  For a possible con-
strual that might work given Badiou’s recent 
criticisms, see Purcell (2012). 
 
8 See Purcell (2010) and (2011). 
 
9 In his exchange with Changeaux, Ricoeur 
seems to leave open the possibility that sci-
entific occurrences just happen, though the 
sense of those occurrences is something that 
humans must process.  See (Changeaux & 
Ricoeur, 2000, p. 4). 
 
10 I am not the first to suggest that Kearney’s 
position is committed to a fundamental ethi-
cal moment.  For another, more detailed ac-
count of Kearney’s commitment to ethics, 
see (Gedney, 2007). 
 
11 Kearney has recently underscored this 
point in a recent essay, writing” “[i[n con-
trast to deconstructive sans-savoir, diacriti-
cal hermeneutics practices a certain savoir, 
which goes beyond Derrida’s maxim of 
‘reading in the dark’” (Kearney, 2011a, p.  
4). 
 
12  For Caputo’s Derridean-inspired work on 
the philosophy of religion see: (Caputo, 
1997, 2006).  For Jean-Yves Lacoste’s 
Heideggerian-esque work see (Lacoste, 
2004).  Marion outlines his account of satu-
rated phenomena in (2002a) and updates it 
in (2002b) and (2007).	  
 
 
 
 
 
